At around 7:15 a.m. a fire started on a packaging line used to engrave bottles at a perfume factory. A maintenance technician gave the alert. Employees attempted to put out the fire with extinguishers, but were unsuccessful. The sprinkler system came on. The employees moved the burning laser engraving machine outside and put out the flames. The firefighters arrived afterwards. The operator cleaned the equipment and the work areas. The firewater was contained in a pond.

A total of 157 employees were evacuated during the fire. One of them suffered slight burns. The packaging line involved in the fire was no longer operable. Eight other lines were affected by water from the sprinkler system. Except for the line that caused the fire, operations resumed after two days of downtime.

The fire started on the filter of the laser engraving machine’s particle extraction system. A particle of cardboard unexpectedly landed on the engraving machine’s lens ignited when the laser was fired. It was drawn into the extraction duct and then entered the felt filter, which burned completely. The conveyor used to move bottles from the engraving machine to the filling station, as well as the nearby electrical conduit, were also burnt. The employees were unable to press the emergency stop button because it was in the flames.

The robot used to unbox bottles and place them onto the engraving line may have torn off pieces of cardboard and pushed either them or dust particles onto the equipment. The operator had not identified this fire hazard at the laser station.

The inspection authorities for classified facilities found a number of deviations:

• the maintenance frequency recommended by the laser engraving machines’ supplier (particularly regarding cleaning of the laser lenses) was ignored;
• the laser system’s safety interlocks (temperature fault, felt filter fault, etc.) were disabled because they caused too many line stops;
• there was no master switch near the exits;
• there was no fire suppression system on the laser station;
• there was no first-response team specially trained to handle the risks involved and operate emergency response equipment.

Since the accident, the operator has:

• installed protective grilles over the filter inlet to prevent the entry of materials (cardboard);
• brought the laser maintenance procedure in line with the supplier’s recommendations;
• created a checklist and instituted patrols for checking the proper cleaning of the engraving machines’ lenses and the operation of the vacuum systems and identifying overheating;
• installed an automatic fire suppression system with a fire and flame detector on the laser station;
• updated its safety report;
• formed an emergency response team and an emergency response unit standing by 24/7.