At around 2:15 p.m., the waste heat flue of a press located in a disused laboratory at a plastics manufacturing plant caught fire after grinding work had been carried out. The laboratory, which was being dismantled, was adjacent to the plant’s polystyrene storage building and administrative offices. Whilst clearing up their worksite, two workers saw flames coming out of the waste heat flue pipe from the press, near the roof. After failing in their attempt to put out the flames with extinguishers, they raised the alert.

Smoke emanated from the storage building’s ventilation ducts but did not spread to its interior. The building sprinkler system was activated. Smoke reached the administrative building, and it was evacuated. The operator implemented the plant’s ‘major emergency plan’ (no internal emergency plan). The plant’s first responders were able to extinguish the fire before the firefighters arrived, who subsequently cooled the affected area and monitored it with an explosimeter. The fire-fighting water was collected in a containment pond.

The fire destroyed electric cables and alarms. The telephone network was also shut down during the incident. Backup power to the plant’s computer room took over after the main power supply was lost. The telephone network and electricity were restored two hours after the start of the event.

The fire had been ignited whilst a subcontractor was cutting into the smoke exhaust duct on an old press. The duct was lined with asbestos. The contractor hired by the operator had subcontracted this work to a company authorised to perform asbestos-removal work. A prevention plan mentioning the shutdown of utilities had been drawn up and a hot work permit had been issued. However, it did not mention shutting off the ventilation system, which was in operation whilst the duct was being cut. Sparks produced during the cutting of the duct were drawn in by the functioning ventilation system. They reached a clogged portion of the duct and ignited a fire that was fanned by the air flow.

The operator has reiterated that fluid supplies must be disconnected and revised the intervention permit so that persons performing interventions are required to sign a document confirming that they have read the prevention plan. It has also separated the hot work permit and the intervention permit in order take better account of inspections before, during and after operations.

The site had not been prepared for a scenario in which all computer, radio, telephone and other resources are lost. As a result, the operator has devised an emergency scenario in which the administrative building is totally out of service.