In a 4,000-m² rubber reprocessing plant, fire broke out around 2 am on a 200-m³ pile of used shredded tyres, inside a 800-m² building. The presence of wind raised fears over spreading to the neighbouring plant. Arriving on the scene at approx. 2:30, fire-fighters had to face building access difficulties and water resource obstacles. They tapped into a stormwater ditch running adjacent to the neighbouring company’s premises while at the same time protected this company from the risk of fire spread. They brought the blaze under control with 6 nozzles; cleanup was performed by the operator, who spread the tyre pile in a pasture using a lorry and 2 backhoes. The operation was time-consuming. A specialised firm was responsible for pumping the extinction water. The classified facilities inspectorate was apprised. Around 4 pm, all of the rubber had been spread into the adjoining fields, and no more gas and smoke was being emitted; the rescue team left the site. The fire, localised at the level of the stockpile of milled residue, did not reach the building; just a few metal siding elements on the eastern facade were deformed, in some cases ripped apart due to the effect of heat. The crushers were still intact. A portion of the extinction water remained contained inside the building and in the immediate vicinity.

The day before, between 5 and 6 pm, a break had occurred on a rotor of the first crusher on the milling chain, causing heating along with the release of sparks. The machine was stopped and cleaned; the residue was stored separately. The remaining employees left the premises around 9 pm. At roughly 2:15 am, the night watchman with a security company hired by a neighbouring firm notified fire-fighters; moreover, the directors of the particular firm were alerted on their cell phones (smoke detection alarm relay).

According to the operator, during the rotor malfunction, sparks were projected onto the stockpile of milled tyre residue placed nearby, causing a slow fire outbreak.

During this incident, fire response services were slowed due to the lack of water resources, as the company had not constituted a fire water reserve. The operator was unfamiliar with the stormwater network layout and moreover possessed neither a hydrocarbon separator nor a cut-off valve. The door sills on the building had not been installed. Consequently, the extinction water could not be contained onsite; the nearby alluvial water table, which had been tapped as a drinking water supply source, was thus vulnerable as was the stormwater network of the activity zone that emptied into the OUCHE River.

Subsequent to this accident, the operator was required to study the modifications to be provided to ensure rapid intervention of emergency services. More specifically, access needed to be possible at all points of the building for the protection of both property and third parties (neighbouring businesses). An inspection and localisation of the company’s stormwater networks was conducted and a plan submitted to the classified facilities inspectorate; also, a cut-off valve and hydrocarbon separator were installed. The site had to be cleaned and all wastes discharged to appropriate treatment centres. The building’s door sills were installed in order to complete the building retention design. A similar fire had previously occurred on 9th June, 2004; the operator was therefore asked to assess precautions to be taken to avoid repetition of such an accident; these precautions comprised: inventory management, volume limitations, building configuration and layout (compartmentalisation, positioning of the preliminary crusher), and availability of water resources.

Given these various points raised, the classified facilities inspectors suggested that the Prefect issue an injunction against the company.