Within a fuel depot 9,000 m³ in size (total capacity: 18,000 m³, containing domestic fuel / diesel fuel / gasoline) divided among 9 containers (8 with a permanent top and 1 with a core wall), a fire of malicious intent was set in one of the basins. Gaining intensity in the basin, the fire spread throughout the entire facility (tanks + the 3,500/4,500-m² basin capacity). The gaseous phase of a diesel fuel container exploded (=> ripping open the roof). The free atmosphere of the container with a core wall containing gasoline subsequently exploded, causing the shell/bottom weld to crack, the tank rose and then fell back onto a dike; the 900 m³ of premium gasoline created a wave that submerged the dikes and infiltrated the stormwater network (combustion/explosions => pollution risk avoided). The battle (that raged for more than 21 hours) required the services of 144 firefighters and the use of 200 m³ of emulsifiers. In all, 7,000 m³ of hydrocarbons were destroyed, and the total cost of the accident appraised at 35 million francs. The strategy adopted to battle the blaze apparently proved inadequate for this particular case.