Fire broke out around 3:30 pm inside a cooling tower of a sugar refinery and spread to 4 neighbouring cooling towers. The 4 subcontractors working in the vicinity of the ignited tower evacuated the premises and notified the internal response team. The Safety Coordinator called in fire-fighters and activated the internal siren placing an emergency call to the Second Intervention Crew, followed by the siren alerting personnel to evacuate the site. All employees and subcontractors present onsite made their way to the meeting point. Around 3:35 pm, electrical supply to the specific zone and its outlying areas was cut. Internal responders removed all utility vehicles from the site as well as the oxy-acetylene bottles adjacent to the fire; they also protected the various materials stored near cooling towers to satisfy tower maintenance needs with a water curtain. Electricity service technicians arrived onsite and confirmed that the site’s complete power cut-off was unnecessary. Gas service staff confirmed that the site was not hooked up to the gas supply network. The internal teams connected their hoses to an onsite fire hydrant, and fire-fighters could directly pump water in the site’s extinction water reservoir, in addition to connecting to a fire hydrant on the public street network. Fire-fighters had the blaze extinguished using 4 nozzles by 4:30 pm.

No victims were reported. All extinction water could be confined onsite, with the greatest amount in the cooling tower retention and the remainder in the 2 stormwater basins plus 2,500 m³ of sealed confinement. Strong winds fanned the fire yet blew smoke towards the plain away from the site. Refinery personnel were able to return to their posts, except for the accident zone, by 4:55 pm. Property damage was estimated at €1 million: 5 of the 6 towers were destroyed and would require complete reconstruction, while the last tower was only partially damaged. The period of sugar production using syrup in stock was delayed by a full month. An elected official and the local gendarmerie visited the site, and the classified facilities inspectorate and prefecture were kept apprised of the situation.

The cooling towers had been shut down since December 2008; they had been both chemically and mechanically cleaned. A company was working in the immediate vicinity on a job to lay 2 new water pipes, while a second company was repairing the interior water downspouts, over the upper part of one of the towers. Hot work permits had been issued for these specific operations. According to the operator, the most likely hypothesis of this incident is that the fire had already been initiated by a hot particle falling onto the plastic honeycomb structure, intended to increase the air/water exchange surface area, during grinding work performed above the cooling tower. In addition to the set of measures already implemented, the operator planned on repeating an awareness training programme for personnel certified to issue hot work permits, as well as diversifying the protective equipment and resources (tarps, heat insulation) and improving evacuation drills.