In an oil depot, 40 cm of gasoline were detected floating in a piezometer, along with 10 cm in a pump shaft. The site operator informed the local town hall and neighbours with systems running on wells or individual water catchment systems. On the day after, a specialised firm began pumping the product into piezometers by use of: a worksite compressor, pneumatic siphoning pumps, suction pipes, an antistatic bag-in-box set on a retention basin in order to collect the product, and lastly a double-walled tank for product storage. Since the level controls introduced on both the 98- and 95-octane unleaded gasoline reservoirs did not allow detecting the lost product, samples were extracted from the water table, but these also failed to identify the origin of the gasoline spill. A pressure test on the underground 98-octane unleaded supply pipeline led to pinpointing a leak on the portion of pipeline beneath the pumping station retention zone. On 11th February, the operator curtailed loading of the 95-rated unleaded as a precautionary measure. Other pressure tests on the 95 unleaded pipeline confirmed that it was leak-free. The results from analyses conducted on another sample of product pumped into the water table indicated the presence of 98-octane unleaded fuel. On 14th February, blanking plates were installed at the outlet of the 2 tanks connected to the suspected pipeline, which was replaced by an underground pipe that had formerly been used for fuel oil and whose seal was verified prior to service start-up. The 95-rated unleaded supply circuit was placed back in service on 15th February. Water quality was analysed in the water table (for total hydrocarbons and for BTEX) during 3 measurement campaigns at 19 points; results were used to expose the impact zone of the high-octane fuel leak.

The operator evaluated the lost volume at 15 m³. On 26th February, 1,250 litres of high-octane fuel were recovered by pumping in the water table. The soils above the water table were loaded with hydrocarbons, and an initial soil biostimulation campaign was held on 13th and 14th February. The Classified Facilities Inspectorate requested weekly groundwater monitoring both at the level of the site and outside the site. A corrosion-induced pipeline perforation was suspected. Subsequent to a major groundwater pollution incident in January 2006 caused by spillage of the spare emulsifier (ARIA 32925), the site had been equipped with 22 piezometers for rapid pollution detection.