In a 2,000 m² warehouse, fire broke out on a Sunday around 4:45 pm inside a 1.3-tonne storage space for products intended for destruction (aerosols, urea, potash, myristic acid, soda ash, calcium chloride). According to the operator, a reaction between incompatible products caused the outbreak of this fire. Trapped in the fire, jugs exploded. Fire-fighters were obliged to open the site’s enclosure and were only able to contact the operator at 5:37 pm, with flames having spread over 100 m² reaching a box containing drums of chromic acid, which would lend a yellowish colour to the extinction water. Plastic bags of oxidiser began to melt in an adjoining cell, separated by a breezeblock wall with a height 1 m lower than the storage cell height. First responders controlled the blaze in 70 min using 4 nozzles at a spray rate of 250 litres/min. The site’s wastewater containment valve was only closed at 5:50 pm, which resulted in a large proportion of the 70 m³ of extinction water entering the public sewer network. The company responsible for the network took samples to be analysed; the effluent collected onsite was pumped by a specialist firm. The Classified Facilities Inspectorate noticed that the damaged building had not been equipped with a fire detection system and moreover that the monitoring company had failed to adopt a written intervention procedure in the event of fire outbreak. The Prefect ordered the operator to comply with all guidelines contained in the permit approval. Following the accident, the operator planned to install in the damaged warehouse a fire detection system completed with automated alarm relays, and revised storage conditions (with an emphasis on strict product separation) for all company warehouses. A subcontractor performed surveillance rounds for several firms operating in the industrial zone, yet was unable to conduct the warehouse inspection visit scheduled for 4 pm, due to a service call elsewhere.