Pollution
Humain
Environnement
Economique

Around 7 am, fire-fighters detected fire in a raw materials storage area at a plant for household hygiene and maintenance products. Besides soda, HCl and surface active agents, this building contained two 30° and 60°C electric ovens used to prevent raw materials from congealing. The outbreak occurred on a 60°C oven holding surface active agents. An investigation (involving fire experts, electricians, the police, fire-fighters, inspection authorities for classified facilities, conducted at the request of the public prosecutor, indicated no power supply malfunction. The hypothesis forwarded was of a package igniting after being set on a convector. The fire was controlled by 9:15 am.

The capacity of the site’s retention basins was insufficient to hold all the extinction water, with the excess overflowing the low retention wall and reaching the CHARENTONNE River. Analyses were performed to evaluate the level of aquatic pollution (pH 10 in the warehouse, 7 in the river). These chemical products generated a foam that floated on the water surface. Fire-fighters installed a dam to avoid substance dispersion and pumped the 28 m³ of extinction water recovered in the basins; 5 fire-fighters were hospitalised for minor burns to their feet after contact with soda. Given the favourable weather conditions, all irritating smoke released by the blaze rose vertically. A safety perimeter was set up. Out of precaution, the electric utility company cut a 20-kV high voltage line, and 10 houses (30 individuals) were evacuated. Neighbours could return home at the end of the morning. No injuries were reported. The plant operator’s monitoring round at 6 pm the day before the fire revealed nothing abnormal. The operator was informed of the accident by the gendarmerie, as video monitoring had not targeted the gas storage zone, which qualified the site under a ‘low tier’ Seveso classification. Operations resumed as of 5 am the next morning. 16,000 kg of the 58,300 kg of raw materials present in the building were destroyed.

Given the nature of this site’s hazards, inspection authorities requested the operator to finalise an internal emergency plan by the end of November. On 13th Nov, an injunction proposed to the Prefect focused on appropriate measures to effectively supervise the entire site, as well as on the design of retention basins in the event of fire or accident.