In the mashing workshop of a site where industrial wastes were being pre-processed to produce substitute solid fuels, fire accompanied by thick smoke broke out at 1:45 am in a 1100-m² warehouse over a 125-m² area of sawdust combined with a top-rated solvent. In accordance with standard practice, one of the 7 night shift employees was transferring, via a mobile power shovel fitted with a bronze bucket, impregnated sawdust from the transport cover to the vibrating table (in an initial screening phase) when flames suddenly surrounded the shovel. The technician was able to escape through a side door. Since the automatic pit extinction system was not operational, its valves remained closed with the electricity outage, and apparently the personnel did not attempt to manually activate the valves using emergency controls located in the building. The fire spread quickly to pasty wastes awaiting impregnation in the other pits. Air samples (taken by the chemical emergency squad) indicated no serious hazard for local residents; nonetheless, a nearby zone occupied by Roma people was evacuated out of precaution and an individual quarantine set up in the city gym. Some 100 well-equipped fire-fighters controlled the blaze in 2 hours. The metal frame building slumped. Fire persisted in the pits and in a suction pipe due to difficulties accessing their respective sources. An adjoining warehouse containing pre-processed combustible substances for incineration at cement works was spared. The extinction water was confined in either the building or a retention basin. Electricity supply to the facilities had been cut off, as the on-site power networks had been heavily damaged; moreover, the unit dedicated to collecting / processing (by regenerating oxidation) volatile organic compounds was out of order. Local authorities visited the site. Both the liquid and pasty wastes were removed. Expert appraisals were conducted. The flashpoint of the treated waste (paint) was higher than usual. Sparked by the backhoe, the fire, even though being detected was exacerbated by the defective automatic extinction system. The extreme summer (heat wave) temperatures constituted an aggravating factor. The site ceased producing substitute solid fuels, merely restarting in 2006 an aggregation workshop with the screening of pasty wastes received in bulk (10,000 tonnes/year).