In a fireworks production facility, an explosion accompanied by a fireball occurred during a resumption in production. The compression operation on the first composition batch (made of barium nitrate, sulphur, aluminium and pulverine) was underway when an initial detonation took place, causing a fire to break out along with, 3 seconds later, a violent reaction (deflagration or detonation) of products awaiting processing in the adjacent honeycomb chambers. A series of intense blast and thermal effects were observed. A technician was very seriously burned; plant premises sustained heavy damage.

One cause of this accident was ascribed to an improper press setting: an inspection of the press did in fact reveal a setting that had remained fixed at 70 bar, which was the pressure used for the “pipe claying” operation conducted during the previous work session, whereas the pressure indicated for 14-calibre jet fabrication was 40 bar. The application of this excessive pressure, ultimately combined with an overly weak composition concentration for the first phase, was able to generate a shock between the compression fuse and the matrix prong, thereby initiating the composition reaction. Other shortcomings contributed to the accident as well: no internal workplace safety report, no workstation safety guidelines, lack of structured personnel training, and the presence of an abnormally high quantity (12 kg) of active ingredients on the premises. Experts stressed these company shortcomings in the area of basic pyrotechnic safety principles.