Pollution
Humain
Environnement
Economique

Shortly after crossing a train station at a speed of 90 km/hr around 11:45 pm, the conductor of a convoy of 14 railcars containing 110 m³ (45 tonnes) of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) felt a jolt and noticed the derailment of 5 tanker cars, which were laying on their side. He activated the emergency brake, stopped the engine, folded the pantograph and ran towards the station 200 m away for protection.

After hitting either an obstacle just beside the track or a rail switch, as evidence has confirmed, the first railcar steel was torn over a 40-cm length and a width extending between 2 and 5 cm, thus causing an LPG leak, along with the formation of a dense cloud that would subsequently explode (a UVCE type explosion) upon reaching nearby residences. An intense fire engulfed the premises; two other explosions were heard a bit later, and another violent fire was blazing at the derailment site itself.

A state of emergency was declared for the entire region, triggering the deployment of over 300 fire-fighters, in addition to heavy assets from both the national and regional levels. The fires were extinguished by sunrise the next morning, while tanker cooling and site clearing activities continued throughout the day. Specialised units then relayed one another in order to empty the cars before being turned upright with a crane and fully discharged. This emergency response was completed 48 hours later.

The toll of this disaster came to 32 fatalities, with a few individuals succumbing several days afterwards, plus 50 injured, among whom 30 seriously hurt. Within a radius of 200 to 300 m, a single-family dwelling and 2 residential buildings were destroyed, while 4 others were heavily damaged with the collapse of a section of their living quarters; a total of 100 individuals had to be relocated. Windows were shattered over an even wider zone. Another 1,100 individuals were evacuated for safety reasons. Several vehicles burned and sections of railroad track were totally deformed by the heat. The extent of damage was estimated at Euros 32 million.

The derailment had been caused by a fatigue fracture of the front axle of the convoy’s first railcar. In conjunction with the judicial investigation, the railway undertaking (“contract operator”) conducted separate investigations to determine the exact causes and circumstances surrounding the accident. The lead car and subsequent vehicles belonged to Polish and German railway undetakings. Placed into service in 2003 and 2006 respectively, these cars had undergone the required regulatory inspections in March 2009 and were scheduled for checking in December 2009. According to sources cited in the press, inadequate maintenance of these cars, whose axles were reported to be rusted, was also identified as a contributing cause.

This disaster was the most serious Italy had experienced in the rail transport industry for dangerous goods and moreover one of the country’s most severe accidents ever catalogued involving the production and distribution of LPG. The initial feedback exposed a number of failings relative to:

  • identification and evaluation of accidental events, safety analyses and residual risks (see the SEVESO Directive dedicated to fixed installations), along with the planning and updating of techniques and/or management solutions designed to mitigate risks. The high speed of railcars in the vicinity of a station (i.e. very dense rail traffic within an urban setting) would seem to be a major shortcoming regarding safety;
  • recognition of equipment scheduled for regular inspection, and definition of maintenance procedures. Adequate vehicle maintenance efforts, including the regular testing of railcar axles and other rolling stock, no doubt constitute another factor to be listed as one of the principal accident causes (i.e. fatigue failure);
  • determination of responsibilities, resources and activity scheduling. The responsibilities of each actor involved in railcar management and mandatory inspections had not been clearly defined.

A working group devoted to freight railcar maintenance, assembled by the European Rail Agency (ERA), concluded its sessions by stressing the need to harmonise the various maintenance systems and protocols existing throughout Europe.

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