At around 5:40 p.m., a fire broke out in an ink fountain cleaning tank containing 200 l of ethyl acetate. This tank was located in a 5,000 m² building of a printing plant specialising in printing on plastic or aluminium substrates. The fire spread to nearby storage drums due to the flammability of the solvents present in the area. The building contained 60 m³ of ink, ethyl acetate and isopropyl alcohol. The 50 employees present at the time were evacuated. As a precaution, the companies nearby confined their personnel indoors. A large contingent of firefighters responded with foam and water hoses. The burning building was separated from the ink storage facility by a firewall. The CO2 inerting system in this room was triggered, allowing it and the rest of the plant to be preserved. The fire was extinguished the following day at 2:35 p.m. The firefighters ventilated the premises before leaving the site at around 6 p.m.

Approximately 600 m³ of extinguishing water was used. Together with the foam used, this water flowed into a bypass canal of the HUISNE River, running alongside the site. A straw dam was installed on this canal, although it was ineffective given the low water level. During its visit to the site, the Classified Installations Inspectorate did not observe any fish mortality in either the canal or in the HUISNE River. The extinguishing water remained confined with the foam in the part of the canal within the site’s grounds. Blackish residues from the burnt material were also present. Part of the ink had solidified at the bottom of the canal. This stagnant water was pumped out and evacuated to a specialised treatment centre. The canal was then cleaned over several dozen metres.

The plant had to be shut down because the workshop in question was required for its operation. Both workshops were reopened on 08/07. Given the nature of the products being used and the presence of clumps of ink on the ground around the plant, the Classified Installations Inspectorate proposed that the Prefect issue an emergency order to analyse the fallout of the fumes in the environment.

According to the operator, a trolley had disconnected the cleaning tank’s earth connection. The removal of an ATEX pump may have triggered the fire, coupled with the high outside temperatures, which exacerbated the phenomenon.

The operator undertook the following measures:

• earthing systems were doubled using overhead lines;
• isolation of the 1,250 kWh transformer at the property line;
• air conditioning of the premises;
• installation of a 6-hour firewall rising above roof level;
• purchase of a water-based ink fountain cleaning machine.