Pollution
Humain
Environnement
Economique

At around 11.30 a.m., smoke was noticed in the fan room of a gas scrubber at a Seveso-classified sulphur fungicide manufacturing plant. The alert was given. The plant’s emergency services supplied the unit’s dry riser and doused the room. Two contractors were sickened by the smoke and taken to hospital. The firefighters arrived brought the fire under control at around 1:00 p.m.

The fire was caused by grinding work done on one of the gas scrubber’s stainless steel ducts. Internal wetting of the area, which contained residues of flammable solids, was planned. This grinding work ended at 11:15 a.m. The deposits in the duct were ignited by the heat generated by the grinding process or a spark. The smoke then rose up the duct and into the fan room. The operator analysed the incident and found the following organisational failures:

  • Grinding preparations, and especially the wetting efficiency, were inadequate due to a lack of personnel: the unexpected absence of an area manager meant that only one person was in charge of checking the hot-work permits.
  • Insufficient identification of the risks: the wetting instructions had been given verbally but, contrary to procedure, not during grinding.
  • Hot-spot checks were not conducted at the end of grinding.

The operator has taken the following corrective actions since the event:

  • The number of people on hand to check hot-work permits is now commensurate with the number of jobs.
  • The hot-work permit procedure has been changed to include written safety instructions and personnel qualification.
  • The shift supervisors have been reminded of the procedure for evacuating the unit.

An accident had occurred at this site at the start of the year (ARIA 49108).