At 00:30 a.m., a forklift driver was transporting a container containing 1.217 tons of granulated pesticide (toxic and dangerous for the environment) from a formulation unit to the central warehouse of a plant that manufactures pesticides and other chemicals for the agricultural industry. For visibility reasons (height of the container) and in accordance with instructions, the driver was manoeuvring in reverse. Having arrived at the warehouse, he noted a trail of granules along the asphalt measuring 1 metre wide and 100 metres long. He alerted the guards the two individuals on duty. At 1:06 a.m., the individual on call initiated the emergency procedure. A security perimeter was set up, and the stormwater facility was secured. At 1:30 a.m., the plant’s firefighters, equipped with the appropriate PPE, collected the product and placed it in drums for subsequent treatment as waste. The ground was then washed with industrial cleaning equipment. At 7 a.m., pellet residues were collected with industrial vacuum cleaners, and the ground was cleaned again. The following day, a sewer cleaner from an external company once again performed a dry suction operation and then wet cleaning with the recovery of the water by suction.

It was estimated that 845 kg of the 858 kg of product spilt had been recovered (in drums and by the vacuum cleaning operations). The difference of 13 kg would correspond to the quantities collected during the washing operations (machines drained and cleaned without analysis).

Low concentrations of the product (15 ppb) were detected in the rainwater catchment pit following rainfall on 02/02 and 05/02, and then disappeared on 06/02.

After filling the container, the procedure consisted in closing the bottom valve (manual guillotine valve), installing a stainless steel plug (bayonet closing system) and placing a plastic bag over the valve and plug to make the assembly watertight. The verifications outlined by the instructions at each stage (and before transfers between buildings) did not allow the absence of the plug or the non-closure of the bottom valve to be detected. The plastic bag initially acted as a valve and then broke when the container was picked up by the forklift, releasing the product onto the ground.

The operator revised the operating procedures and improved the inspection protocols. A program was initiated among the personnel to raise awareness with regard to inspections, how to initiate an emergency procedure (via a call box) and provide training in the new procedures. A physical system is being studied to ensure that the valve is closed before handling, as well as the feasibility of transporting containers on platforms equipped with a retention system. Finally, although the valve was not implicated, it foresees a preventive maintenance plan for the containers’ bottom valves (checks for possible hardpoints).