An unattended freight train comprising 72 tank wagons loaded with 113 m³ (100 tonnes) of crude oil and five locomotives rolled down a 1.2% grade and into a town at 100 kph. Sixty-three wagons derailed in the centre of the town. Four explosions occurred and 5700 m³ of blazing petrol spread the flames along the ground and into the sewers. The firefighters set up a 1 km-radius safety cordon and evacuated 2000 people. The blaze burned for two days. Special fire-retardant foam was brought in from a neighbouring refinery and firefighters from the US lent assistance.
Heavy toll of a derailment in the centre of town
The accident killed 47 people, destroyed 30 buildings, and affected a 2 km² area of the town. Twelve hundred residents were not able to return to their homes until three days later; 600 others returned home six days later. The employees of 115 businesses were temporarily laid off. The Chaudière River was contaminated by 100 m³ of oil along 80 km, killing scores of fish. As a result, swimming and fishing were prohibited in the river. Three towns located downstream stopped drawing water from the river and installed a temporary drinking-water system that was used for two months.
On 17 July, the rail company stopped funding the clean-up operations. The Federal Minister of Transport ordered the company to resume clean-up and spent C$8m (€5.8m), which it re-billed to the company. On 22 July, the federal government released C$35m (€26m) to repair the town’s damaged infrastructure and paid C$25m (€18m) to the Government of Quebec to pay back the cost incurred to respond to the accident, evacuate the population, and clean up the hazardous substances. It announced that it was setting aside a C$60m (€44m) fund to assist survivors and affected businesses, rebuild the town, and get its economy back on its feet. The railway company filed for bankruptcy on 7 August.
Train left unattended on a track overnight
At 11:00 p.m. on the day of the accident, the train engineer parked the train on a main line as the adjacent siding, which has derailers, was not available. The engineer applied the air brakes (for the entire train) and left one of the diesel locomotives running to keep air pressure supplied to the train’s air brakes. He then applied the hand brakes of 10 of the 72 wagons and of the five locomotives and then left for the night. At 11:50 p.m., the firefighters responded to a call reporting a fire on the locomotive. As per their protocol, they stopped the locomotive before fighting the fire. Two technicians from the railway company went to the scene. With all the locomotives shut down, the air pressure progressively dropped until the air brakes stopped working. The hand brakes were no longer able to hold the train.
The accident was caused by the combination of multiple factors:
- The train was parked and left unattended on a main line. Doing so was subsequently prohibited on 23 July by the Federal Minister of Transport (directive in effect for six months, renewable).
- According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), an insufficient number of hand brakes had been applied.
- The DOT-111 wagons involved in the accident are known to have thin walls. Since 2011, the Canadian government requires wagons with thicker shells, but older models were still allowed to operate.
- The railway company’s employees summoned after the arrival of the firefighters confirmed that the train was safe and then left.
- The analyses ordered by TSB revealed that the sweet crude produced from fracking was more volatile and flammable than indicated on the shipping documents (category II instead of category III: flash point below 23 °C).
Many lessons drawn from the disaster
After the accident, the Federal Minister of Transport required that two engineers must be on board trains carrying hazardous materials in order to better catch mistakes and facilitate manual operations (it takes between two and three minutes for one person to apply the hand brakes for each wagon). It also demanded that all the crude oil transported be retested before shipment. Regulations were changed so that tank wagons also have thicker steel shells and their top rigging is fitted with protections and shields.
In France, the risk of unauthorised or accidental movement of rolling stock is reduced by fail-safe brakes (which immobilise a wagon when the air pressure is insufficient) and wedges.
