In a cosmetic plant set up on a chemical platform, a transfer valve is accidentally opened at 3:45 pm right when employees were attempting to connect a hose to a lorry tanker containing 20 tonnes of 98% hydrofluoric acid (HF) in order to load a storage tank. A large cloud was released from the tanker and 8 tonnes of HF were discharged into the atmosphere. First responders successfully stopped the leak after a 7-hour battle; 5 employees were killed and another 18 hospitalised for intoxication due to inhalation.

In the vicinity, 4,195 individuals, including 416 fire-fighters, were examined for nausea, skin rashes, pulmonary disorders and irritations. 212 ha of farmland were contaminated and over 3,900 intoxicated head of cattle had to be slaughtered. The acid corroded more than 1,200 vehicles. 9,100 tonnes of plants affected by the release were burned. Evacuated neighbours were the focus of an epidemiological study, and 12,000 residents underwent medical exams. The economic losses caused to the shutdown of 80 plants on this platform and to facility damage were appraised at €15 million.

Fire-fighters responded without knowing the exact nature of the accident and without adequate protective. They sprinkled the leak with water, thus exacerbating the product release. Called as backup, fire-fighters from the nearest military base had to take charge of halting traffic around the plant to prevent neighbours and vehicles from circulating in the toxic cloud that had formed. They notified the police, asking them to continue this effort, and evacuated the population within a 1.5-km radius. The authorities’ slow reaction was criticized, as 300 neighbours directly concerned by the release were not evacuated until 10 days after the accident; also criticized was the lack of adequate resources made available to first responders in particular the lack of neutralising agents (lime) for the first 22 hours of the response. Within a 20-km radius, land declared in the “disaster zone” had to be cleaned within the next several weeks, and the same applied to buildings. The adjacent evacuated populations would be followed as part of an epidemiological study.

The initial evidence assembled by the police, including in particular recordings from a transfer station surveillance camera and an examination of the damaged tanker, revealed that 2 employees had climbed onto the tanker to hook up the air hose intended to purge acid in the tank from the tanker vehicle. The first one was connecting the air hose while the other one, in order to save time, began unscrewing the buffer bolts on the acid outlet valve. This 2nd employee then accidentally struck the arm of the manual outlet valve, which partially opened allowing the pressurised HF to flow out. During road transport, an internal pressure surge had been created by the thermal expansion of the product. In violation of the profession best practices, the tanker had not been previously degassed and hoses had been used. Both employees were killed, as were the 3 others working in the adjoining unit; none were wearing the appropriate individual protective gear. Legal charges were filed against the plant director.

Given several fatal accidents on industrial sites using HF in the months before and after this accident, authorities lax enforcement of regulations and limited monitoring of these sites was reported in the press. The next year (2013), the government strengthened regulations and controls on industrial facilities working with flammable or toxic products; moreover, a chemical safety agency was created.