Around 1:40 pm, lightning struck 4 lightning rods within a chemical plant, causing an electricity outage. Some of the ammonia (NH3) storage sensors were damaged, and this in turn triggered the corresponding installation safety sequences. The storage equipment fire detection post also sustained damage. The urea and NH3 production facilities were not included in these sequences due to the presence of an alternator, which supplied all the necessary electrical power.

While waiting to reset the various detection devices that had been activated, the operator adopted several measures: bringing back online the storage zone by shunting the damaged detectors, with the permanent presence of a technician in the NH3 storage control room; inspecting once per station those electrical utility rooms whose fire detection was no longer operational; prohibiting the loading of railcars, trucks (NH3, alkali) and boats; and shutting down the alkali production line.

The 4 impacts recorded on 4 different lightning rods at the site may be explained by a branching of the arc-back (lightning surge). Another explanation (which would still need to be confirmed however) is that the arc-back only struck a single lightning rod or any other installation and then while spreading through the soil, the lightning current caused a high enough rise in ground potentials to produce current spikes via earth electrodes within the lightning protection installations. Such a phenomenon could have incremented the 4 lightning strike counters.

The classified facilities inspectorate noted that the preliminary lightning assessment was inadequate and requested that the site operator conduct a new study as quickly as possible. Moreover, the operator was required to assemble a spare parts inventory for all site safety equipment.