In a latex mattress factory, a fire started in the dryer. At 9:50 pm, an employee saw flashes of light near the dryer and alerted the technician, who witnessed the onset of fire on a mattress at the entrance to the dryer. He called for a stop to the casting, alerted the guardhouse, opened the vapour valves to flood the dryer, and unrolled the fire hose. With the situation brought under control by staff, the fire-fighters who were called at 10:25 pm removed the mattresses from the dryer. At around 11:30 pm, the dryer was emptied, and cleaning of the area continued. Fire-fighters left the scene at 12:30 am. The extinction water was channelled to the plant’s 200-m³ holding tank for treatment at the site’s evapo-concentrator. Only one electric motor was damaged, but this did not affect the installation restart. As a precautionary measure, production was not restarted on the weekend. Cleaning of the conveyor was planned and the non-burred joints on the moulds were changed. The accident was due to a faulty temperature control of the steam which caused overheating in the dryer: a temperature > 140°C at the inlet to the pre-dryer and the first drum was notified at 8:15 pm. The fact that the fire began at the entrance of the dryer in the first few metres and that the mattresses were core-browned, called the pre-dryer operations into question. In addition, upon restarting the process, the pre-dryer temperature was high (~125°C); the extraction duct at the entrance was sagging. The operator decided to accelerate replacement of the faulty pilot regulator, to reduce the arrival of steam to limit the temperature and to straighten out the exhaust duct. The operator proposed to control the pre-dryer temperature controller twice a year, to limit the steam supply to the pre-dryer so as not to exceed 117°C (self-ignition temperature T = 150°C), to position the safety probe in the most appropriate place, and during the next shutdown to replace the used intake and exhaust ducts. The Classified Facilities Inspectorate asked the operator if the safety alarm was working and if the chosen threshold limit was compatible with the overheating kinetics of the mattress (time period compatible with a staff intervention from the time the alarm is activated). The operator indicated that the horn was broken and moreover that no periodic check of the detection chain was performed. Since that time, the operator has implemented a quarterly review of the pre-dryer probes and set up a testing device for the visual and audible alarm, which are now monitored periodically. A safety procedure was implemented in the event of an alarm being activated at the pre-dryer, dryer and heating unit tunnel (alerting the fire department and on-call emergency services, shutdown of the latex flow, removal of mattresses and foam control). The operator was also requested to prepare a report and centralise incidents into a specific document.