Inside a malt house, fire broke out at 12:40 pm on an installation producing animal feed pellets. The malt-maker had started up the press at 12:10. After allowing extra time for the press to gain intensity, he cut the dust feed screw. Despite rinsing the press, some holes on the line systematically remained blocked at night. The malt-maker then overrode the default values and inspected the facilities; upon hearing the press running, he reported directly to his workstation. At 12:37 pm, temperature in the cooler surpassed 50°C, which was typically the maximum, and quickly rose thereafter. At 12:42, the press shut down by virtue of a default setting due to overheating in the forced air cooler.

A technician heard the fire alarm, noticed smoke emanating from the 5th floor (press) and flames on the 4th floor (cooler); he sounded the general alarm and called the fire station. Plant personnel were evacuated. Two technicians cut electrical supply to the press and sprayed the extinguishing agent; 2 other technicians unsuccessfully attempted to extinguish the fire raging inside the cooler with extinguishers. Around 1 pm, fire-fighters installed a water pumping device in the Escaut Canal. A technician shut off power and then the malt silo’s electric generator. The emergency crew quickly brought the blaze under control. At 3:50 pm, current to the facility was restored. At 4, the operator informed the Classified Facilities Inspectorate; faced with an explosion risk, fire-fighters used a foaming device in order to spread foam on the dust hopper surface, which was shovelled clean thereafter. No hotspot was detected. Fire-fighters left the site around 6 pm. Regular patrols were conducted for the next 2 days. The cooler was completely destroyed. Given that this activity was ancillary to the business, the amount of financial losses was minimal. The Inspectorate visited the site on 26th May, and the unit was restarted on 29th May.

The fire would have been caused by the arrival of pellets in the cooler at abnormally high temperature, with the forced air then stoking the ignition. The press was disassembled and cleaned: a defective ball bearing assembly at the level of the motor shaft might have triggered the heating, which was then magnified by a lack of lubrication. The shaft was changed and lubricated, and the maintenance procedure strengthened. Next, the operator: verified shutdown of the circuit at the fire alarm activation switch, connecting the fire alarm to the alarm relay system; servo-controlled the plant’s gate opening to facilitate access for first responders; checked rinsing time during the semi-automatic press operating mode; reduced the temperature thresholds for shutdowns and alarms; installed an automatic ball bearing lubrication verification system for the press shaft; and set up an “extinction outlet” at the cooler, hooked up to an extinguisher. An accident of this type had previously occurred, but the operator did not respond by implementing adequate prevention measures.