Fire broke out around 6 am in a cell of a warehouse containing pharmaceutical products. The fire then spread to storage zone no. 1 and preparation zone no. 1. This first depot (featuring both storage and preparation) was built in 1991, while depot no. 2 (storage, preparation) dated from 1993. A 2-hour firewall separated the two storage zones, as well as storage zone no. 1 from preparation zone no. 1.

Flames and smoke were visible several kilometres around. First responders had to evacuate 60 employees, in addition to setting up a safety perimeter and informing the Paris Airport Authority of possible nuisances caused by the smoke, all the while ensuring accessibility to the site’s access lanes. Some 100 fire-fighters were deployed to the scene. After protecting the intact portion of the building, the emergency crew fought the flames from above using an articulated crane. The fire extinction water, which was collected in retention basins, was treated by a specialised firm. Emergency workers sampled and analysed the smoke on a regular basis, with results always turning up negative.

Around 7:30 am, one of the firewalls was no longer able to resist. The fire was spreading towards the oldest part of the facility (depot no. 1) and its offices. The site’s fire protection resources were diminished due to the 3-year maintenance interval. The site’s main 990-m³ fire water reserve was practically empty. Fire-fighters could only rely on their own reserves, a private hydrant and a pond located 1,300 m away. Given the water supply challenges encountered, fire was able to spread to the company’s cafeteria set up in the office zone as well as to the unloading platforms. The inoperability of the fuse devices controlling the closing of certain fire doors also facilitated the spreading of smoke and hot gases. The fire was ultimately extinguished at the periphery of the refrigerated storage depots.

As a result of this accident, 15,000 of the 45,000 m² of warehouse space were destroyed. The fire did not penetrate the 4-hour firewall (composed of two 2-hour doors) between cell no. 2 and cell no. 3bis, nor did it penetrate the 2-hour firewall placed between storage zone no. 2 and preparation zone no. 2. Fire-fighters cooled these walls during their response. The refrigeration units apparently remained intact.

Authorities conducted an investigation to determine the causes and circumstances surrounding this accident. The Classified Facilities Inspectorate visited the site on 25th April, 2008, observing that the internal emergency plan had not been relayed to several government agencies and moreover that fire drills had not been recently performed. Inspectors proposed an injunction order for these various points.

The operator also commissioned a study by a specialised body, which indicated that given a storage depot containing cardboard and polyurethane, fires extend beyond local control after 3 minutes from the time of outbreak.