In a chemical plant, fire broke out around 11:30 pm at the dichloroethane cracking furnace (DCE) producing vinyl monochloride (VCM). The IOP was activated, and the platform response team and external emergency team alerted.
Fire spread through the unit after an ‘explosion’ in a furnace. Water curtains were activated, and internal responders fought the blaze using powder; focus on the fire source with foam started 7 min from the time the incident began.
The fire spread through the furnace and pumping stations. Efforts to secure the unit began around midnight by cutting supply lines: ethylene, chlorine, and natural gas. The emergency services used self-breathing apparatuses to fight several fires on a unit in the presence hydrogen chloride (HCl) fumes.
The furnace and fluids were isolated at 12:25 am and the unit was stopped. At 12:50, the fire was brought under control in the furnace. At 1 am, the intensity of the fire decreased after complete isolation from the circuits of the particular unit. At the same time, a substantial flow of foam was reported at ANSE d’AUGUETTE, and a lorry was dispatched to the scene to pump this foam. At 1:20, the fire was extinguished at the pumping station, and a few small fires remained between floors. At 2, the small fires between floors were extinguished with just one fire beneath the reflux drum remaining. Moreover, the presence of foam in seawater was reported and marine fire-fighters installed dams. At 2:25, the fire in the reflux drum was extinguished and the media (press, radio) were informed. The IOP was lifted at 4:10 am. Simulations of the fire performed by the operator showed that given the day’s wind conditions, the HCl cloud did not extend beyond the site boundary.
A furnace consisting of a combustion chamber was heated with 100 burners fuelled by natural gas. This room was crossed by a radiation beam where the DCE was circulating. This incident was caused by drilling into a furnace tube (diameter: 8 mm), resulting in a product leak and a localised fire. The leak then worsened (13 mm), with a depressurisation of products in the furnace plus a blast effect. Following this overpressure, the furnace explosion vents and access panel were opened, triggering the release of burning material and an extension of emissions to the unit and cable trays. Expert reports were conducted to determine the state of tube corrosion. The operator decided to strengthen the closure of access panels in order to prevent their opening in the case of overpressure, in addition to introducing a remote-controlled smothering vapour valve, which could not be approached during the accident. Work on the affected chain lasted several months.
