When degassing a previously drained iso-container at a chemical plant, a bromine jet (Br2) burned a site technician’s leg. The accident occurred during the morning in the presence of 2 technicians working with vented hoods and a foreman; since this degassing operation was programmed for the night-time shift, the unit’s circuits had been isolated. When disconnecting the ‘liquid phase’ of the drained iso-container, a quantity of Br2 leaked slightly onto the flange of the tank valve. The technician then opened the container’s ‘liquid phase’ valve, resulting in the liquid Br2 rise that caused the accident. Upon noticing the leak, the valve was immediately closed again. The injured technician, removed from the premises by a co-worker, was rinsed off in a safety shower and then hospitalised for 24 hours: he was burned on the leg and inhaled bromine vapours during his time spent in the shower. Since the transfer zone had been confined and equipped with an air treatment device, no environmental impacts were recorded: the Br2 detectors in the room did activate, as opposed to those installed outside the unit.

The accident analysis revealed :

• a number of deficiencies, namely: the ‘liquid phase’ valve on the container’s dip tube had been left open while the line was disconnected;
• only the manifold had been degassed;
• inspections and controls conducted during the operation had not respected protocol;
• the technician had not been certified to handle valves as part of a manufacturing supply system.

Various measures were adopted :

• including a reminder issued to all personnel regarding appropriate operating protocol (prohibited from opening an iso-container valve in the presence of disconnected flanges);
• a revision to the procedure indicating degassing operation steps;
• container connection and disconnection instructions;
• the introduction of more detailed workstation measurement reporting tools
• and suggestions for enhancing individual protective gear (anti-acid suit, boots).