Pollution
Humain
Environnement
Economique

Around 4 pm at a transit facility for household waste, non-hazardous industrial waste and special waste, an employee noticed smoke emanating from a case of phytosanitary products. The temp manager proceeded by isolating the calcium carbide and storing other cases in the cell at 6:45 pm. Around 8:30 pm, fire broke out in the 30cu.m cell containing 38 tonnes of hazardous waste stemming from dumpsites and industrial facilities. Working inside the household waste sorting centre, a technician heard an alarm trip and consulted the connection panel: fire was detected inside the special waste handling centre. In theory, the fire water should have been contained onsite within the 1,000cu.m retention space formed by concrete pavement, an outer wall and a shutoff valve on the stormwater drainage network. The employee engaged the emergency pushbutton, which in turn activated this valve, without first verifying its operability, as his fellow co-workers were evacuating from the premises. One hour later, fire-fighters remarked that the valve had not been properly closed; they reacted by plugging the network downstream and had the blaze contained by 10 pm. The extinction water flowed into the Erier watercourse via the stormwater network, whose manager installed a floating boom at the outfall and as of 11:45 pm indicated no suspicious observations. Under the rain, the potentially toxic black smoke released formed a vertical plume. Since electricity supply to the facility had been cut during the incident, the operator did not immediately provide the log of products stored onsite: paints, solvents, alcohols, aerosols, phytosanitary products, and laboratory products (with no acids included in the inventory). The liquids had been packed in sealed tanks and the pasty products on pallets and in retention containers. In excluding vandalism and electrical problems, the operator surmised that an exothermic reaction had taken place following the contact of 2 incompatible substances (rainwater infiltration?). The special waste storage building was destroyed, but no injuries were reported. An emergency governmental order issued on 26th August imposed continued interruption of the hazardous waste sorting and transit activity (for special wastes, dispersed toxic wastes). Moreover, the operator made plans to build partition walls and fire walls; separate the incompatible products into 2 distinct modules; store the phytosanitary products, aerosols and laboratory products in 3 different cabinets; introduce a delivery receipt system; and provide training for all replacement personnel.