An explosion occurred inside the volatile organic compound (VOC) extraction and treatment unit linked to two washing tunnels in an industrial wipe cleaning company that uses water, soda and washing powders. These wipes are mainly used to absorb solvents, greases, and inks, etc., spilled on the ground or on equipment to be cleaned. They arrive in drums and are pressed to eliminate a proportion of the solvents before passing through the washing machine. The accident occurred on the VOC incinerator, following the build-up of hot gas in the transfer pipe (800 mm) for a gaseous product containing a solvent. The electricity was turned off to shut down the motor transporting the product. Fire-fighters ventilated the rooms and cooled the pipe. The main cause put forward by the operator was a malfunction in the control of an effluent switching device that was dependent on the analysis of chromatographs. This was compounded by a lack of knowledge of the nature of the chromatography measurements f and of the conditions for determining the oxidiser’s permissible concentration thresholds. The inspection authorities for classified facilities asked the operator, before restarting the oxidiser, to submit a hazard analysis with a risk analysis covering the entire effluent treatment chain, describing and clarifying certain points: operation of the analysers, definition, justification and representativeness of the concentration threshold in relation to the installation’s operation, procedures for securing the installations, detection of the VOC concentration peaks, reactivity of the equipment in line with the flux conditions in the ducts and on-site staff training. The only damage was to property: the installations affected by the explosion included all of the equipment constituting the thermal oxidiser (chamber, heat exchanger, pipes, etc.), the extraction fan belts, the aeraulic circuit channelling the flux of VOC originating from the 2 washing tunnels and the droplet separator.